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FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS: PROCEDURAL 
RIGHTS OF THE SUBPOENAED WITNESS 
Frank C. Newman* 
MOST information that federal agencies seek they get without forcing people to testify. Sometimes, however, when in-
vestigators on their own cannot uncover the facts and an informed 
person refuses to cooperate, he will be summoned to appear and 
answer questions, under penalty of contempt for refusal. 
Many questions he need not answer. Agencies may not abridge 
his first amendment rights, for example, or deny him benefits of 
the privilege against self-incrimination or the common-law priv-
ileges. Further, the Administrative Procedure Act states that "No 
process . . . shall be issued, made, or enforced in any manner or 
for any purpose except as authorized by law"; and courts may 
enforce a summons only "to the extent that it is found to be in 
accordance with law."1 Thus the relevant statutes and regulations 
are to be combed for technical requirements, and subpoenaed wit-
nesses can insist that the inquiry be within the agency's authority 
and that all information sought be reasonably pertinent.2 
Those substantive rights of witnesses were discussed at length 
in the 1950's. There is a rich literature on what questions are 
Iawful.3 But there has been no parallel discussion of witnesses' 
• Dean, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed. 
For research assistance I am indebted to Malcolm Burnstein, LL.B. 1958, University 
of California. I am indebted also to the Walter E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, 
for a grant that helped sustain this and related inquiries, and to the University of 
California Committee on International Legal Studies, for a grant that helped sustain 
Mr. Burnstein.-F.C.N. 
1 Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 60 Stat. 240 (1946) , 5 U.S.C. §§ 1005 (b), (c) 
(1958). Concerning the force of a threat to impose judicial penalties, see 1 DAVIS, AD· 
MINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.11 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]; GELLHORN &: 
BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 605-11 (4th ed. 1960); cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 
315 U.S. 357, 363 (1942). 
2 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); D. G. Bland Lumber 
Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1949). "The statutes bestowing this [sub-
poena] power have not been uniform in providing means for and eliininations [liinita-
tions?) upon its exercise and enforcement methods and sanctions." An'y GEN. COMM. 
ON An. PROCEDURE REPORT 414 (1941). For tabular presentation of technical require-
ments, see id. 415-35. 
3 See 1 DAVIS, §§ 3.01-3.14 ("Investigation') ; 2 id. § 14.08 nn. 23-25 (common-law 
privileges) ; McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. 
& P.S. 138 (1960). The McNaughton article also discusses "1st Amendment Privilege" at 
145 n.37, and other privileges at 150 n.52. Cf. Judge Stanley Barnes' instructive opinion 
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procedural rights, and some comments that have appeared are 
disturbingly inaccurate.4 Further, the Supreme Court has now 
pronounced on the subject in Hannah v. Larche;5 and parts of the 
Justices' opinions are puzzling, as we shall see. 
This article is designed to help fill a gap in the literature and 
to warn government attorneys, particularly, about some ques-
tionable asides in the Hannah case. We shall not deal with record-
keeping requirements or with agency inspections, subpoenas duces 
tecum, and related search and seizure problems. The focus in-
stead is on the subpoenaed witness; 6 that is, a man who knows 
that force may be used against him unless pursuant to government 
command he appears and answers questions. 7 We examine several 
rights that may protect the witness;8 and we shall also ask whether 
the agencies, to discharge their governmental duties, truly need 
the subpoena power. 
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Our Supreme Court Justices still quarrel as to the constitu-
tional right of a witness to be represented by counsel.9 Fortunately, 
in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960); Note, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 347 (1957) • 
4 See, e.g., Note, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1214, 1216 (1941) ("Since the results of an in-
vestigation are not conclusive against a witness, the due process clause would seem to 
impose no restraints on administrative inquiries."); Note, 35 NoTRE DAME LAw. 440, 
441 (1960) ("[T]he privilege against self-incrimination ..• would seem to be the only 
protection these witnesses have •••• "); cf. TAYLOR, GRAND INQ.UESI' 242 (1955); 
Liacos, Rights of Witnesses Before Congressional Committees, 33 B.U.L. REv. 337, 383 
(1953) ("There is no judicial enforcement of minimum procedures • • • .") ; Note, 
1 N.Y.L.F. 6 (1955) . 
o 363 U.S. 420 (1960). 
6 Our aim here is to identify the rights of a witness who is subject to sanctions for 
contumacy or whose answers, because of government-sponsored publicity, may tend to 
defame, degrade, or incriminate him. We do not examine rights that inhere in other 
threatened deprivations of his liberty or property (by adjudication, for example) • 
7 Commands that a person fill out a questionnaire or submit a report are similar to 
subpoenas ad testificandum; but they do not involve a personal appearance, and the 
procedural rights thus differ. If a witness has appeared and would be subject to 
penalty for refusal to answer (e.g., if he refuses to tell "the whole truth") he should 
be entitled to the rights of a subpoenaed witness even though he originally may have 
appeared voluntarily. 
8 The rights examined here apply to all witnesses, I believe, whether the proceedings 
are purely investigatory or are designed to aid adjudication and rule-making. ·witnesses 
who are also parties may have additional rights, of course, which are catalogued in 
chapters 6 to 16 of I, 2 DAVIS, §§ 6.01-16.14. 
9 See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 451 n.31 (1960); id. at 493 Gustices Harlan 
and Clark concurring) ; id. at 486 (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring) . But in the 
Hannah case there was no dispute on the right to counsel, and the Court's seeming 
approval of § 102 (c) of the Civil Rights Act ("Witnesses at the hearings may be 
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that due process question has little application to federal agencies. 
They are nearly all subject to the Administrative Procedure Act;10 
and in that act section 6 (a) states, "Any person compelled to ap-
pear in person before any agency or representative thereof shall 
be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and advised 
by counsel . . . ."11 There are no exceptions, and the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has reminded us that the guarantee 
is worth taking at face value.12 
THE RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT 
Just as he often needs counsel, a witness may need to know 
exactly what were his answers to questions he was forced to answer. 
Again the APA is clear (and its words suggest that the drafts-
men had in mind some cases that did require attention13). Section 
6 (b) states, "Every person compelled to submit data or evi-
dence shall be entitled to retain or, on payment of lawfully pre-
scribed costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof, except that in 
accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their 
constitutional rights.'') is at best weak dictum. 363 U.S. at 433; cf. id. at 492 (Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter concurring) . It can be argued first, that that section does not 
supersede § 6 (a) of the APA; and second, that it is unconstitutionally restrictive. See 
Newman, Some Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 Ju,. L. REv. 
120, 127 (1961). The Court overlooked similar arguments that FTC and SEC restric-
tions on the right to counsel are illegal. 363 U.S. at 446, 447 n.26; cf. Backer v. Com-
missioner, 275 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1960). 
10 See Newman, What Agencies Are Exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act?, 
36 NoTRE DAME LAw. 320 (1961). Concerning exempt agencies, see Niznik v. United 
States, 173 F.2d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 1949) (Selective Service); Lopez v. Madigan, 174 
F. Supp. 919, 921 (N.D. Cal. 1959) (Parole Board). The Niznik case, relying as it 
does on United States v. Pitt, 144 F.2d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1944) ("[H]e at no time 
requested ••• counsel ••• .''), is doubtful authority. Michel v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 
188 F.2d 224, 226 n.6 (5th Cir. 1951), is of limited relevance because the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board exercises no subpoena power. 
We know too little about the right of a witness to have the tribunal assign counsel 
to him. Cf. United States ex rel. Castro-Louzan v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. 
Pa. 1950) ; Kramer, The Place and Function of Judicial Review in the Administrative 
Process, 28 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 72 (1959) ; and see Jacobson v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 728 
(3d Cir. 1940) (no free transcript) ; Rackow, The Right to Counsel-Time for Recogni-
tion Under the Due Process Clause, IO W. REs. L. REv. 216 (1959) . 
11 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (a) (1958). 
12 Backer v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960) (freedom to select counsel 
upheld) . Section 6 governs, "Except as otherwise provided in this Act .•• .'' 60 Stat. 240 
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (1958). With respect to the right to counsel there appear to 
be no such exceptions. See generally 1 DAVIS § 8.10; GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. cit. supra 
note 1, at 594-95. 
13 In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Mascuch, 30 F. Supp. 976 
(S.D.N.Y. 1939); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1936); cf. Edwards v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 473, 481 (1941). 
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a nonpublic investigatory proceeding the witness may for good 
cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript of his 
testimony."14 
PUBLIC OR PRIVATE HEARING? 
The sentence just quoted assumes that "nonpublic" investiga-
tory proceedings are permissible. A witness apparently has no 
constitutional right to be heard in public.15 But constitutional 
rights may evolve from an improper denial of his request that 
the hearing be private.16 And many statutes and regulations re-
quire that some investigative proceedings be private, others pub-
lic.17 As yet there have been few discussions of this whole prob-
lem, and its perplexities will not be explored here.18 
THE RIGHT TO NOTICE 
Would this subpoena be legal? "You must appear at the 
address shown below next Monday at 10:00 a.m. before an official 
who, and to answer questions which, at that time will be identi-
fied." If our witness had no other notice as to the content of 
questions that might be asked, his lack of preparation could even 
impede the government's need for information. Yet there are 
cases implying that that subpoena constitutionally could be en-
forced.19 
14 60 Stat. 240 (1946) , 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (b) (1958) . 
15 See Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 294 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 
(1957); Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, 789 (7th Cir. 1944); Woolley v. United States, 97 
F.2d 258, 262 (9th Cir. 1938); cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 
288 U.S. 294, 322 (1933). 
16 Cf. Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 105 (D.C. 
Cir. 1939),; Herold v. Herold China &: Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 9II, 917 (6th Cir. 1919); 
Note, 35 IND. L.J. 251 (1960) ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 509 (1958) . "[F]or many defendants 
undeserved publicity could in its own way become as much a source of injustice as secrecy 
ever has been." Rourke, Law Enforcement Th,·ough Publicity, 24 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 
246 (1957). 
17 See, e.g., Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 788, 49 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958); Invest-
ment Advisers Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 848, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-10 (b), (c) (1958) (private) ; Food 
and Drug Rules, 21 C.F.R. § 285.17 (1955) (private); Tariff Commission Rules, 19 
C.F.R. § 201.ll (1961) (refers to statutes requiring public hearings) ; cf. E. Griffith 
Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1933); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 
229 (D.D.C. 1948) . 
18 See l DAVIS § 8.09. 
19 See the following grand jury cases: In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931); 
In re Meckley, 50 F. Supp. 274, 275 (M.D. Pa. 1943) ; cf. Eisler v. United States, 170 F.2d 
273, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1948). United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950), 
states that the demand must not be "too indefinite"; and in GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. dt. 
supra note 1, at 579, there is a quotation from a Solicitor General's brief indicating a 
concession by the government (nearly twenty years ago) that a subpoena may be resisted 
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I. What Is the Practice in Federal Agencies? So far as I know, 
no scholar or anyone else has ever studied a fair sampling of 
investigatory proceedings to find out whether subpoenaed wit-
nesses, in fact, are denied basic information regarding the questions 
they will be asked. The Supreme Court made a survey of sorts 
in Hannah v. Larche, and comments on that survey seem called 
for. The question in Hannah was whether a federal court erred 
when it issued this injunction: 
"[D]efendants ... [members of the United States Commis-
sion on Civil Rights] are enjoined and restrained from con-
ducting the proposed hearing in Shreveport, Louisiana, 
wherein plaintiff registrars, accused of depriving others of 
the right to vote, would be denied the right of apprisal, 
confrontation and cross-examination."20 
The Supreme Court concluded that the lower court had erred, 
and vacated the injunction. The majority opinion states: 
"The history of investigations conducted by the executive 
branch of the Government is ... marked by a decided ab-
sence of those procedures here in issue. The best example is 
provided by the administrative regulatory agencies. Al-
though these agencies normally make determinations of a 
quasi-judicial nature, they also frequently conduct purely 
fact-finding investigations. When doing the former, they are 
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, ... and the 
parties to the adjudication are accorded the traditional safe-
guards of a trial. However, when these agencies are conduct-
ing non-adjudicative, fact-finding investigations, rights such 
as apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examination generally 
do not obtain."21 
Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent-with Mr. Justice Black's approval 
-had this to say about that statement: 
"References are made to federal statutes governing numerous 
administrative agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the in-
ference is that what is done in this case can be done there. 
This comes as a surprise to one who for some years was en-
gaged in those administrative investigations. No effort was 
on the ground that it is "unduly vague." Cf. Perry &: Simon, The Civil Investigative 
Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division, 58 MICH. L. REv. 855, 866 
(1960) ("Notice'') . 
20 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 429 (1960). 
21 Id. at 445. 
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ever made, so far as I am aware, to compel a person, charged 
with violating a federal law, to run the gantlet of a hearing 
over his objection. No objection based either on the ground 
now advanced nor on the Fifth Amendment was, so far as 
I know, ever overruled. Investigations were made; and they 
were searching. Such evidence of law violations as was ob-
tained was turned over to the Department of Justice. But 
never before, I believe, has a federal executive agency at-
tempted, over the objections of an accused, to force him 
through a hearing to determine whether he has violated a 
federal law. If it did, the action was lawless and the courts 
should have granted relief. "22 
What is troubling is that the majority and the Douglas state-
ments both seem inaccurate. Mr. Justice Douglas's suggestion that 
no agency, over the objection of an accused, has ever forced that 
accused through a hearing to see if he was guilty is rebutted even 
by SEC cases.23 He does fairly ask, though, whether any objection 
based "on the ground now advanced" (i.e., denial of apprisal, 
confrontation, and cross-examination) has ever been overruled. 
An analysis of the majority's response to his question, and of the 
many authorities which were cited to demonstrate that "when 
these agencies are conducting nonadjudicative, fact-finding inves-
tigations, rights such as apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examina-
tion generally do not obtain," appears elsewhere.24 The criticisms 
there will not be repeated here. The author's conclusion is that 
the Court did not present ". . . a sampling of investigatory pro-
ceedings that tells us whether subpoenaed witnesses, in fact, have 
been denied rights of apprisal, confrontation, and cross-examina-
tion. The references . . . do not demonstrate any history that is 
marked by a 'decided absence' of those rights."25 
22 Id. at 504. 
23 See Loeb & Crary, 3 S.E.C. 324 (1938) , discussed at 40 n.80 of Arr'y GEN. COMM. 
ON .AD. PROCEDURE SEC MONOGRAPH (1941); Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 
(1941); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 467 (1894); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Dd., 
146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1944); Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944); In re SEC, 
84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936); SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). Supporting 
Mr. Justice Douglas, see United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956); Arr'Y GEN. 
COMM. ON .AD. PROCEDURE NLRB MONOGRAPH 5 n.20 (1941) ; cf. Ludlam, Tax Fraud 
Investigations: A Plea for Constitutional Procedures, 43 A.B.A.J. 1009, 1010 (1957) 
("until it decides against criminal prosecution, it will not issue a summons to the tax-
payer ••. "). 
24 See Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 735 
(1961). 
25 Id. at 767. 
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2. What Does Due Process Require as to Notice'! In Hannah 
the Court discussed the rights of "apprisal confrontation, and 
cross-examination" as if they were all in one package. The Court's 
treatment of the facts, though, suggests that there was no rejection 
of a right to notice and that the word "apprisal" denotes some-
thing different from what most observers would call the right to 
notice (i.e., notice to a witness of the kind of questions he may be 
asked). The voting registrars who sought relief in Hannah had 
been subpoenaed by the Civil Rights Commission, which has au-
thority to investigate complaints that some people have improperly 
deprived other people of the right to vote. With respect to apprisal 
the Court stated, 
"The specific constitutional question ... is whether persons 
whose conduct is under investigation by a governmental 
agency of this nature are entitled, by virtue of the Due Proc-
ess Clause, to know the specific charges that are being investi-
gated, as well as the identity of the complainants .... 26 
"It should be noted that the respondents in these cases did 
have notice of the general nature of the inquiry. The only 
information withheld from them was the identity of specific 
complainants and the exact charges made by those complain-
ants. Because most of the charges related to the denial of 
individual voting rights, it is apparent that the Commission 
could not have disclosed the exact charges without also re-
vealing the names of the complainants."27 
There may be doubt whether those last two sentences find support 
in the record.28 The holding, nevertheless, is that due process 
was not violated when the "only information withheld" was the 
identity of complainants and the exact charges they made. The 
Court thus implies that a good deal more was known by these sub-
poenaed witnesses than the "general nature of the inquiry." By 
no means did the Court approve an agency's denying to a witness 
notice of the kind of questions he may be asked. 
Moreover, the Court's own doctrine of pertinence assumes 
some notice. That doctrine establishes that (I) a witness may 
demand from his investigators enough data to . enable him to 
26 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 441 (1960). 
21 Id. at 441 n.18. 
28 See Newman, supra note 24, at 739 n.5. 
176 MICHIGAN LAW R.Evmw [Vol. 60 
measure a question for its pertinence to the subject under inquiry, 
and (2) that subject must not be identified too vaguely.20 
Existing cases do not, however, assure to an agency witness 
the notice right that a distinguished American Bar Association 
committee believed should be assured in legislative investigations. 
They said, "The witness should receive proper notice of the sub-
ject matter to be considered in the hearing, so that he may know 
generally what the committee is after, what kind of examination 
he will be expected to face, and what evidence or pertinent in-
formation he should produce."30 Should due process be construed 
to require less than that, if the witness can show prejudice? 
THE RIGHT To .ANswER COMPLETELY, To EXPLAIN, To REBUT 
Not all notice comes from pre-hearing information. The test 
is not whether a witness has had a chance to write out or memorize 
his answers beforehand-so that his syntax will be admirable, 
say, or his replies to embarrassing questions as subtly misleading 
as possible. The test is whether an honest intent to answer truth-
fully might be perverted by surprise. 
Can there be doubt that this statement, if truthful, is not 
contemptuous? "I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I can't answer that 
question because I don't trust my immediate recollection; and I 
won't be able to tell 'the whole truth' until I have had a chance 
to reflect on the matter (or look at my files, t~lk to my associates, 
etc.) ."31 That illustrates too that a witness sometimes need not 
comply with a command to "Answer yes or no." 
In this article we do not deal with proposals to allow a de-
famed, degraded, or incriminated non-witness to submit state-
ments defending his repute. When by subpoena a man has been 
compelled to appear, though, may government officials-while he 
29 See NEWMAN &: SURREY, LEGISLATION 341-59 (1955); Slotnick, The Congressional 
Investigating Power: Ramifications of the Watkins-Barenblatt Enigma, 14 MIAMI L. 
R.Ev. 381, 397 (1960); Notes, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 740, 746 (1957); 106 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 124, 
125 n.14 (1957). 
30 REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 
INDIVIDUAL RIGIITS AS AFFECTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY, Appendix 30 (1954). 
31 The author recalls a World War II investigation where a harried government 
official, brought in from the corridors of the House Office Building with no notice what-
soever, conscientiously took so long reflecting on his answers to questions about agency 
policy that the committeemen, bored more than they could tolerate, finally adjourned 
the hearing for lack of patience. 
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is testifying or thereafter-fairly say: "Stop! You have no right 
to explain your answers or rebut inferences that inhere in them"? 
If the explanations or rebuttals are written, must they not be 
received under the first amendment right "to petition the govern-
ment"? And does not section 6 (a) of the APA create a supple-
mentary right to appear in person for that purpose? It reads, 
"So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, any 
interested person may appear ... for the presentation, adjustment, 
or determination of any issue, request, or controversy in any 
proceeding (interlocutory, summary, or otherwise) or in connec-
tion with any agency functions."32 The value of that section and 
of the right to petition too often has been overlooked. 33 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION 
Every subpoenaed witness is concerned with rights as to notice, 
counsel, the course of reply and rebuttal, and a transcript. Those 
rights seem reasonably guaranteed by either a generally applicable 
statute (the APA) or due process. Rights of confrontation and 
cross-examination are radically different. For some witnesses they 
are impossible to grant, and they are generally guaranteed by 
neither statute nor due process. 
The reason they cannot apply to all witnesses is that in many 
proceedings there is no one to confront or cross-examine. That is 
the case, for example, when an agency subpoenas a man to ask 
him about reports he has submitted. No third party need be in-
volved. Similarly, if the subpoena has been inspired by an anony-
mous phone call, even though a third party is involved there is no 
way to confront and cross-examine him. Accordingly, our analysis 
can apply only when the questions put to a witness relate to a 
known third party or one who could be identified. 
For investigations the APA says nothing about confrontation 
and cross-examination, and Hannah holds that no such rights 
inhere in due process. The Court spoke emphatically and seemed 
32 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (a) (1958). 
33 Concerning rules that require incorporation in the record, see Newman, Some 
Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 An. L. R.Ev. 120, 126 (1961). 
Concerning rights of non-witnesses, see Scott & King, Rules for Congressional Commit-
tees: An Analysis of House Resolution 447, 40 VA. L. R.Ev. 249, 268-71 (1954); cf. United 
States v. Boyer, 150 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Cu.. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1019; Annot., 
170 A.L.R. 161 (1947). 
178 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 
not to care whether the hearing was public or private; whether, 
if private, later publicity might injure the witness; whether the 
aim of the investigation was or was not to determine the need 
for a follow-up adjudication; or whether third parties had filed 
affidavits accusing the witness of misconduct or had testified in 
his presence or had sought anonymity or immunity from ques-
tioning. 
We will not guess whether Hannah is likely to be modified. 
Even if its due process pronouncements stand, however, (1) as a 
precedent it governs only those cases where the congressional 
intent to deny confrontation and cross-examination seems clear,3'' 
and (2) the Court's discussion of "policy" hardly demonstrates 
that, absent such intent, denial is advisable or that rights to con-
front and cross-examine should be withheld when new investiga-
tory procedures are prescribed.35 Therefore it is desirable to 
outline some ideas as to fairness and efficiency that judges, ad-
ministrators, advocates, and procedure reformers should keep in 
mind. 
(1) Even when the questions put to a witness do relate to a 
known third party or one who could be identified, we need not 
in investigations impose rights greater than those which apply in 
adjudications. In other words, enthusiasm for confronting and 
cross-examining must be tempered by an awareness that admin-
istrative law history involves a wise rejection of many confrontation 
and cross-examination rules that have governed trial courts (e.g., 
rigid doctrines of hearsay arid judicial notice) . 36 
(2) Wigmore's reminder that the main aim of confrontation 
and cross-examination is efficiency (i.e., getting at the truth) is 
impressive. 37 Yet to allow the rights in some proceedings would 
be too complicating, too delaying, too costly. Rule-making pro-
ceedings provide an example; and the subpoenaing of a man to 
testify as to practicable safety rules, say, scarcely requires for truth-
determining that he be allowed to confront and cross-examine all 
other people who submitted data. The example calls to mind, 
34 See 363 U.S. at 430-39. 
35 See Newman, Due Process, Investigations, and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 735, 
744 (1961). 
36 See GELLHORN 8: BYSE, op. cit. supra note l. 
37 See Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. Pun. 
L. 381 (1959); cf. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 31 (1954) . 
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however, Kenneth Davis's legislative-adjudicative fact dichotomy.38 
Truth as to adjudicative facts in an investigation may well best 
be assured by the testing we believe is advisable for such facts 
in an adjudication. 
(3) Facts that defame, degrade, or incriminate a subpoenaed 
witness merit special treatment. It is one thing if they are kept 
secret, or are used only by government officials who decide whether 
to institute the kind of an adjudicatory proceeding where rights 
to confront and cross-examine will be respected. It is something 
else if there is no subsequent proceeding and if the adverse facts 
are nonetheless publicized-before, during, or after the hearing 
to which the witness has been subpoenaed. In that case, to the ex-
tent that identifiable third parties have supplied derogatory data, 
does not decency require that confrontation and cross-examination 
generally be allowed? Similarly, though borderlines between in-
quiries that are based on accusations and those that are not may 
sometimes be dim, do not confrontation and cross-examination 
seem peculiarly apt when, concededly, the investigation relates 
to sworn accusations against the witness (the situation in Hannah)? 
(4) Both ancient and recent history warn us about the face-
less informer and the danger of using his tales as an excuse for 
abridging a man's right to be let alone.39 The Supreme Court has 
now decided that in investigations, at least, the value of secret in-
formation offsets those dangers--or, more accurately, that Con-
gress may permit accusatory data to be kept secret when Congress 
concludes that its utility against a subpoenaed witness offsets its 
risks. The fact that Hannah was a civil rights case, however, de-
cided at a time when retaliations against the Negro who dared 
protest discrimination were regularly headlined items, may sug-
gest that persuasive evidence of the societal need for secrecy is 
crucial. If the "informer system" must be protected-and there 
are telling arguments in its favor40-when should it be extended 
to people who are not regularly employed confidential agents? 
In cases where informers are to testify at the same hearing as 
the subpoenaed witness (the situation in Hannah), is there any 
reason why they should not be cross-examinable? And is there 
38 1 DAVIS §§ 7.01, 7.02. 
so See Pollit, supra note 37. 
40 HARNEY&: CROSS, THE INFORJ\IER IN LAW ENFORCEJ\IENT 81 (1960); cf. McCoRJ\IICK, 
EVIDENCE § 148 (1954). 
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justification for diluting the effectiveness of cross-examination 
that could better be ensured in those cases by prior identification?u 
(5) Even when cross-examination might be too complicating 
or too delaying, could we not often allow confrontation? And 
should we not sponsor substitutes for the kind of cross-examining 
that traditionally has characterized criminal trials? (Consider, for 
example, the technique of submitting questions to be put by the 
presiding officer, so that he can evaluate them, rather than by 
counsel for the witness directly.) And could we not also shield 
efficiency by insisting that the witness demonstrate, through refer-
ence to what he believes is The Truth, his need to cross-examine? 
That need was not considered in Hannah, unfortunately, because 
the litigation there involved threatened rather than actual agency 
proceedings. The Court might wisely have postponed its sweep-
ing pronouncements until it knew exactly how the subpoenaed 
registrars in fact were prejudiced.42 
MISCELLANEOUS RIGHTS 
If the witness in an investigation believes other people's tes-
timony would help him, may he bring them in or have them 
subpoenaed?43 May he insist that testimony affecting him be 
sworn? Does he benefit from a Jencks rule or any discovery right 
41 Cf. Newman, supra note 35, at 744. 
42 Id •. at 745, 759. 
43 APA § 6 (c) states: "Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be issued to any 
party upon request and, as may be required by rules of procedure, upon a statement or 
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought." 60 Stat. 240 
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (c) (1958). Section 2 (b) tells us that "'Party' includes any 
person ••. named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to 
be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding .... " 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 (b) (1958) . When individuals have been named as parties to investigations, as oc-
casionally they are [see, e.g., FTC Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 1.40 (1960) ], they can probably 
benefit from § 6 (c) because § 6 (b), by the phrase "nonpublic investigatory proceeding" 
indicates that an investigation is a proceeding. Professor Kenneth Davis says that to 
regard all investigations as "proceedings" would strain the accepted meanings of AP A 
words too much. I DAVIS § 3.01 n.l; cf. id. § 8.10. Even if that is true, investigations 
are clearly proceedings when they are aimed at the formulation of an order. See APA 
§ i2 (d), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (d) (1958); and for an illustration, see 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act § 335, 52 Stat. 1045 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1958): 
"Before any violation of this Act is reported by the Secretary to any United States at-
torney for institution of a criminal proceeding, the person against whom such proceeding 
is contemplated shall be given appropriate notice and an opportunity to present his 
views, either orally or in writing, with regard to such contemplated proceeding." Cf. 
United States v. Los Angeles & SL.R.R., 273 U.S. 299, 309 (1927) (property valuation 
by ICC); 68 Stat. 938 (1954), 42 U.S.C. § 2135 (b) (1958) (AEC must report violations 
of law to the Attorney General) • 
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against the government?44 May he refuse to answer questions that 
are uncivilized, indecent, vicious? Are investigators sometimes 
so motivated by personal interest or prejudice that a whole pro-
ceeding becomes illegally tainted? 
Observers who read the New York Times or the Washington 
Post & Times Herald know that those questions are more than 
hypothetical. A good many editorialists and some law reformers 
have argued that, for legislative investigations, statutes recognizing 
a variety of related rights should be enacted.45 So far as I know, 
for agency investigations there is yet no common or constitutional 
law which would make such statutes superfluous. 
Sometimes, though, we credit too much the absence of pre-
cedent. The mere lack of cases on the question, say, whether wit-
nesses ordered to appear in Washington, D. C., must pay their 
own travel costs hardly makes us conclude that they must. Some 
rules of fair dealing are so obvious that even warped investigators 
recognize them. (E.g., witnesses who speak no English are en-
titled to translations; unheard questions must be repeated; rea-
sonable recesses must be allowed.) And some scattered court 
rulings on such questions as venue suggest that judges can do 
justice even without the aid of authoritative prior pronounce-
ments. 46 
THE TRUE NEED FOR TESTIMONY 
The discussion so far shows that, in investigations, procedural 
problems range widely. To honor a subpoenaed witness's rights 
requires reference to bulky statute and case law, and some wis-
dom and imagination besides. What might happen if, to ·avoid 
complexities, we were to restrict the number of witnesses whose 
cases create problems? Do government officials really need the 
power to compel testimony? 
Writing over thirty years ago (prior to the New Deal, even), 
Professor Milton Handler made these comments: 
44 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 669 (1957); cf. GELLHORN &: BYSE, op. cit. 
supra note 1, at 615 ("Is a Litigant Entitled To Compel Production of Government 
Documents?', • 
41i REPORT ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE ABA SPECIAL COMMITI'EE ON 
INDMDUAL RIGHTS AS AFFECTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY is the best over-all statement. 
40 Bank of America Nat'l Trust &: Sav. Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100, 107 (D.C. Cir. 
1939), 28 CALIF. L. REv. 240 (1940) (venue); In re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 746, 748 
(S.D.N.Y. 1937) ("The court will not give assistance to a summons if abuse is plainly 
proved.'1; cf. United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953) • 
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"How could the income tax laws be enforced if the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue were denied the power to exam-
ine the books and records of taxpayers and to compel the at-
tendance of witnesses and the production of papers? How 
could the Commissioner of Patents, the Commissioner of 
Pensions, Immigration inspectors, the Comptroller discharge 
their duties without similar or analogous powers? ... It was 
not without reason that Congress invested the Secretaries of 
Agriculture and Commerce, all departmental officials in the 
investigation of claims against the government filed with 
them, the President or his agents under Trading with the 
Enemy Act, and the Director of War Risk Insurance with 
similar powers ... [and] the same holds true for the Inter-
state Commerce, the Federal Trade, the Federal Power Com-
missions, the Shipping Board, and the China Registrar, which 
in addition to determining rights and duties, promulgating 
and enforcing regulation, conduct extensive investiga-
tions."47 
In the same year, however, Ernst Freund concluded that "circum-
stances must be very exceptional indeed in which the authority 
cannot make a prima fade case on the basis of information pro-
cured without resource to compulsory powers .... "48 And David 
Lilienthal two years earlier had suggested, "Before a legislative 
body grants an unlimited power to compel the attendance and 
testimony of witnesses, it should consider carefully whether the 
legislative purposes cannot be effected without such a broad 
grant."49 
By way of further answer to Professor Handler's questions, we 
learned in 1941 from the Attorney General's Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure, first, that several agencies with functions 
by no means unique do manage to get along without subpoena 
power (Post Office, Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Federal 
Reserve Board, National Railroad Adjustment Board, National 
Maritime Board, War Department); and, second, that other agen-
cies empowered to issue subpoenas seem not to use them (Tariff 
47 Handler, The Constitutionality of Investigations by the FTC, 28 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 
905, 925-27 (1928) • (Emphasis added.) 
48 FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 184 (1928) • 
49 Lilienthal, The Power of Government Agencies To Compel Testimony, 39 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 694, 722 n.104 (1926). 
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Commission, Railroad Retirement Board, Veterans Administra-
tion) .50 
I do not imply that agencies need less power to (I) bring 
witnesses into quasi-judicial hearings, (2) inspect premises and 
documents, or (3) demand record-keeping and reports. Instead, 
for "pure" investigation (distinguished from the kind of inquiry 
that inheres in a quasi-judicial hearing), I wonder if agency 
investigators truly have demonstrated either a dependence on 
compelled testimony or a gain from such testimony that anywhere 
near offsets the dangers that lurk in powers to compel. Professor 
Davis has observed, "The litigated questions usually relate to 
records and written reports, seldom to oral testimony."51 And it 
is probable that lack of litigation relates more to disuse of the 
power to compel testimony than to lack of legal issues involving 
its use. 
Agency officials sometimes act like judges, sometimes like leg-
islators, sometimes like prosecutors and police. "[P]olice have no 
legal right to compel answers .... "52 And as to prosecutors, ju-
dicial comments like these perhaps reflect a fundamental premise: 
"I do not understand that a minor Government official can 
summon people at will to give testimony about their affairs 
and the affairs of their customers and neighbors. A United 
States Attorney cannot do that."53 
"It would have been surprising had Congress attempted to 
authorize the Nation's chief prosecuting officer and his sub-
ordinates to compel a citizen to appear in government private 
offices to answer questions in secret about that citizen's con-
duct, associations, and beliefs. Some countries give such 
power to their officials. It is to be hoped that this country 
never will."54 
This country has given like power to many officials-even to a 
ISO ATI'Y GEN. Co?.IM. ON AD. PROCEDURE REPORT 416-31 (1941); cf. Hannah v. Larche, 
363 U.S. 420, 470 (1960) ("The [Food and Drug] Act makes no provision for compelling 
testimony.''). 
lSl l DAVIS § 3.02, at 164. 
52 McNaughton, supra note 3, at 151 n.56. 
53 Cook v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 445 (D. Ore. 1946) • 
54 United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179, 195 (Mr. Justice Black concurring); cf. id. 
at 191: [T]his Court construed congressional enactments as designed to safeguard 
persons against compulsory questioning by law enforcement officers behind closed doors 
••• "; Durbin v. United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
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few "chief prosecuting officers";55 and the time may have arrived 
to evaluate what thus the legislatures have wrought. 
What might be the fate in Congress of a bill that read like this? 
"All grants to any agency of the power to compel testimony other 
than in an adjudicatory proceeding are hereby repealed; but 
nothing in this Act shall affect the powers of courts, grand juries, 
or committees of Congress; nor shall any power to require written 
records and reports, to inspect, or to issue subpoenas duces tecum 
be affected.'' 
First, would the glaring exemption of congressional commit-
tees be so discomfiting that Congress would choose not to face its 
critics' scorn? I think not. We do need reforms for congressional 
investigations. Yet that a few committees of Congress ask questions 
which many people believe are improper hardly means that agency 
officials should have the same power.56 Nor need the full 
investigatory powers of Congress be delegated merely because 
agency regulations often have the effect of statutes, for data-gather-
ing resources other than subpoenas ad testificandum are typically 
more available to agencies than to Congressmen. There are also 
many reasons for withholding from appointed rather than elected 
officials the use of forced testimony to promote "the stimulation 
of public opinion and ... the conduct of political warfare."57 
Second, would federal agencies fight the proposed statute? 
They could be expected to oppose it when the Bureau of the 
Budget forwarded the bill for their written comments. But on 
the stand-as witnesses before the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees, say-how many agency executives could conscien-
tiously insist that they, as policemen and prosecutors, need powers 
which for centuries with remarkable consistency we have denied 
to ordinary police and prosecutors? How many could argue, m 
55 See 1 DAVIS § 3.04, at 179; cf. Perry &: Sim.on, supra note 16. 
56 Professor Davis argues that powers delegable to a congressional committee are 
patently delegable to an administrative agency. 1 DAVIS § 53.04, at 175. That may be true 
in constitutional law, but it does not follow that such powers should be delegated as a 
matter of legislative policy. Cf. Langeluttig, Constitutional Limitations on Administra• 
tive Power of Investigation, 28 ILL. L. REv. 508, 513 (1933) • 
57 Dean Edward Levi, quoted in Newman, A Legal Look at Congress and the State 
Legislatures, in LEGAL INsrrrtJTIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 81 (Paulsen ed. 1959); and 
see Newman, Some Facts on Fact-Finding by an Investigatory Commission, 13 AD. L. REv. 
120, 129 (1961) • 
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connection with their rule-making functions and their duties to 
recommend legislation to Congress, that to be effective they 
require the exposure powers, for example, of a Senator Kefauver 
(on organized crime), or a Senator McClellan (on the crimes of 
organized labor), or a Senator McCarthy (on the problems that 
bothered him) ? How many could demonstrate that their agencies, 
in fact, have relied on the power proposed to be withdrawn? Re-
member that subpoenas duces tecum, subpoenas in adjudicatory 
proceedings, and miscellaneous powers to inspect and require re-
ports would not be touched. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerning constitutional law, Professor Kenneth Davis has 
advised that the spirit behind such statements as this pronounce-
ment of Justice Stephen Field has become "utterly exhausted": 58 
"A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial compulsory inves-
tigation, conducted by a commission without any allegations, 
upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or 
of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or ca-
price, is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an 
inquisition would be destructive to the rights of the citizen, 
and an intolerable tyranny." 
An impressive array of Supreme Court holdings demonstrate that 
Professor Davis is correct, and flavor is added by quotes that show 
approval, for instance, of "a power of inquisition ... which ... 
can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, 
or even just because ... [the agency] wants assurance that it is 
not."50 
The message of this article is (I) that apart from constitu-
tional law, Justice Field's dictum merits re-examination, (2) that 
Congress, agencies, and the courts could help reinvigorate the 
spirit behind such dicta by recognizing some procedural rules that 
would ensure basic decencies, and (3) that some perilous prece-
dents could easily be offset by a statute that would restrict the 
power to compel testimony to the kinds of proceedings where 
58 1 DAVIS § 3.01, at 162 [quoting from In re Pacific Railway Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 263 
(N.D. Cal. 1887) ]. 
59 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) • 
186 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
history has shown that the potential abuses of that power are 
tolerable. 60 
60 I.e., agency adjudications, court and grand jury proceedings, and legislative in• 
vestigations. In agency adjudications the rights identified in this article (counsel, tran• 
script, notice, etc.) would be available to all witnesses; but our experience with court 
trials, where witnesses' rights seem generally to have been protected, suggests that in 
adjudication the subpoena power is significantly cushioned. The characterization of 
grand jury and legislative abuses as "tolerable" does not mean that witnesses in those 
proceedings should be denied the procedural rights proposed here for agency proceed-
ings. The doubt is whether the public interest requires that agency investigators be given 
the power to compel testimony, but there is no such doubt as to grand juries and legis-
lative committees. 
